ABSTRACT
Introduction
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has always played a key role in the development of common rules in the field of intellectual property (IP) law. Since the establishment of the common market, the Court has systematically expanded the reach of EU law in the field of IP, despite the lack of an explicit power-conferring provision in primary EU law. Initially, the Court found that national rules on IP have a great impact on the exercise of the free movement of goods and competition rules. which remains a field where few EU rules exist.
Direct effect and the WTO agreements
The WTO agreement, like any other international agreement concluded by the EU, 12 presents a benchmark for the assessment of the legality of EU and Member State legislation. Based on Article 216(2) TFEU, which provides that EU international agreements are binding on EU institutions and on Member States, the Court has been very eager to review the legality of EU and Member State acts on the basis of their compatibility with EU international agreements.
Recognising international law norms as an important source of EU law, 13 the pending case in Daiichi Sankyo 42 presents a unique opportunity for the Court to clarify these questions and acquire an active role in the interpretation of patent law in the EU.
EU exclusive competence and the TRIPS Agreement
One of the most significant changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty is that it introduces clear rules with regard to the scope of Union competence in the area of IP protection. As was discussed above, since the creation of the WTO, the EU has struggled to determine its scope conclusion, but also to future developments. 47 The Lisbon Treaty did away Article 133 (7) TEC, which granted the possibility to the Council to extend the scope of paragraphs 1-4 of Article 133 EC Treaty to the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements on IP in general. Therefore, in order to safeguard that the EU can conclude any future agreement on IP under the WTO or another international framework, a dynamic interpretation of commercial aspects of IP should be adopted.
The extensive scope of EU competence over all aspects of IP, including patent protection, is not affected by the fact that the EU has not legislated yet in that specific field apart from limited sectoral interventions. 48 large measure" by EU legislation, fall within the scope of Union law. 53 However, the discussion concerning the level of legislative activity that is of 'sufficient importance' to bring a provision of a mixed agreement within the scope of EU law is only important for provisions falling under shared competence.
Areas of EU exclusive competence fall within the scope of Union law, irrespective of whether the Union has legislated in this field. 54 As was already discussed, the determination of the scope of Union law, and subsequently of the legal effects of a provision found in a readier access to the patent systems maintained by different contracting parties (principle of national treatment, principle of priority and principle of independence). 63 Above notes 16and 17. 64 Above note 34. 65 "Under Articles 27 and 70 of the TRIPS Agreement, do patents covered by the reservation in Article 167(2) of the 1973 Munich Convention which were granted before 7 February 1992, that is to say, before the above agreement entered into force, and concerned the invention of pharmaceutical products, but which, because of the aforementioned reservation, were granted solely to protect their production process, fall within the protection for all patents pursuant to the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and, if so, what is the extent and content of that protection, that is to say, have the pharmaceutical products themselves also been protected since the above agreement entered into force or does protection continue to apply to their production process only or must a distinction be made based on the content of the application for grant of a patent, that is to say, as to whether, by describing the invention and the relevant claims, protection was sought at the outset for the product or the production process or both?" 66 Merck Genericos, above note 9, para 40. 67 According to article 1 EPC "The EPO grants patents by a centralised procedure with uniform conditions, but once granted the patents become national and subject to the divergent national laws of EPO-Member States". 68 Articles 52-57 EPC. 69 Such issues are the determination of acts which constitute infringement, the effect of prosecution history on interpretation of the claims, remedies and infringement or bad faith enforcement, equitable defences, the coexistence of a European patent and a national patent for identical subject-matter, ownership and assignment, extension to patent term for regulatory approval. See V. Rodriguez, 'From National to Supranational Enforcement in the European Patent System' (2012) Secondly, in parallel to the EPUE, for which infringement, limitations and its exhaustion will be harmonised under the current scheme, there will be three other types of patents within the Union. These are the national patents, the "old" European patents granted by the EPO, for which the parties wish to keep a bundle of national patents, 91 development of patent policy, thus not comprising the internal market as such. It only shifts the national borders and thus the effects of territorial segmentation remain. Although enhanced cooperation has been achieved in the past in other fields of EU law, the internal market has always been a field where legislative initiatives applied to the entire territory of the EU. Next to the issues of legality concerning the procedure of enhanced cooperation, 93 the lack of enhanced cooperation in the internal market can be explained by the fact that it creates an additional threat for economic, social and territorial cohesion in the internal market, it constitutes a barrier to or amount to discrimination in trade between Member States and may distort competition.
As a result, the proposals regarding the EPUE and the UPP are not able to achieve complete harmonisation in the field of patent law, at least it their current form. Besides, given the technical and political complexities surrounding this field, it is still unclear if and when legislation will actually be approved. and makes TRIPS the most important multilateral statement in this field". 95 The TRIPS Agreement defines patents, albeit indirectly, it introduces a non-discrimination principle and sets a general restriction to the general principle of eligibility to be patented, as well as more "focused" exceptions. 96 Article 29 introduces the "person skilled in the art" test for the satisfaction of the disclosure requirement. More importantly, the agreement also delineates the rights conferred to product patents and process patents 97 Considering that the UPP Regulation will be part of Union law, the Court of Justice can employ the TRIPS agreement in order to determine the standards of protection under national and EPO-granted patents by reference to the standards of protection of EPUEs, so as to ensure uniform implementation of the TRIPS agreement in the EU.
In addition, the CJEU can mitigate the danger that arises from the existence of parallel adjudication regimes for patent protection. The establishment of the Unified Patent Court with jurisdiction over EPUEs, but not over the infringement of national or EPO-granted patents without unitary effect 106 may actually result in competition among jurisdictions. The
Unified Patent Court and national courts will be aware that in reaction to their rulings, parties may switch to the patent system "run" by the court giving the more "desirable" rulings. 107 At a first glance such judicial competition cannot be remedied by the CJEU, as it will hold competence over matters related to the EPUEs, 108 but cannot review national laws on patent infringement given the lack of harmonising secondary legislation. Nevertheless, by allowing the CJEU to determine whether national courts abide by the TRIPS when they adjudicate patent infringement cases, the CJEU can act as the single, ultimate judicial authority in the EU, ensuring coherence and consistency in the interpretation of the different regimes of patent infringement rules.
Consequently, the CJEU's interpretative jurisdiction over the TRIPS can constitute a significant tool in the process of establishing a complete and uniform framework for patent protection in the EU. Despite the minimum standards approach of the TRIPS agreement, the CJEU can use its interpretative jurisdiction in order to fill in the gaps that the recent initiatives left open and ensure coherence and consistency in the application of the different regimes of patent protection in the EU.
Conclusions
The road towards uniform patent protection in the EU is filled with traps. In the past two 
